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Public and Private Sector Compensation: What is Affordable in 
This Recession and Beyond?—A conference summary
by Lise Valentine, vice president and director of research, The Civic Federation, and Richard H. Mattoon, senior economist and 
economic advisor
On February 26, 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and The Civic Federation 
hosted a forum to examine the differences in wages and benefits between the public 
sector and private sector and to discuss best practices in work force sustainability.
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Materials presented at the 
forum are available at 
www.civicfed.org/ev090226_
pensionforum.html.
For many years, conventional wisdom 
has held that public sector wages were 
lower than private sector wages, so gen-
erous ancillary beneﬁ  ts were needed in 
order to attract and retain skilled work-
ers in the public sector. More recently, 
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) have suggested to some 
observers that total compensation aver-
ages of the public sector now signiﬁ  cantly 
exceed those of the private sector. Eco-
nomic pressures and global labor trends 
have led many private sector ﬁ  rms to 
eliminate expensive beneﬁ  ts, such as 
deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension plans (in favor 
of deﬁ  ned contribution plans),1 but 
most public sector agencies have not 
followed suit. Such changes have created 
a greater perceived gap between public 
sector and private sector employees in 
terms of both ﬁ  nancial security and 
overall compensation.
The participants at this forum were invit-
ed to discuss these compensation differ-
ences and the assumptions behind them. 
The obvious question was the following: 
Who gets better pay and beneﬁ  ts—public 
sector or private sector workers? The par-
ticipants illuminated various issues that 
make this question difﬁ  cult to answer. 
While, at ﬁ  rst blush, this might seem like 
an easy comparison to make, the aggre-
gate wages and beneﬁ  ts data on both 
types of workers do not tell the whole 
story on compensation differences. There 
are also many factors to consider before 
one can draw any conclusions about how 
each sector can attract and retain the 
most effective work force.
Review of the data
Jay Mousa, regional commissioner, U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Chicago 
Regional Ofﬁ  ce, along with Greg 
Philipaitis, assistant regional commission-
er, described what kind of data the bu-
reau collects and what that data tell us 
about differences in wages, health in-
surance, vacation time, and retirement 
beneﬁ  ts. Mousa noted that 16.4% of U.S. 
workers are employed in the public sec-
tor. More speciﬁ  cally, federal govern-
ment employees make up 2.0% of the 
work force; state government employ-
ees, 3.7%; and local government em-
ployees (including teachers, police, and 
ﬁ  reﬁ  ghters), 10.6%. This distribution 
has been fairly stable over recent years, 
with the largest additions to the public 
sector being teachers.
The BLS’s September 2008 Employer 
Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) 
survey shows that average total compen-
sation in the private sector is $27.07 per 
hour, while the average total compen-
sation in the public sector (state and 
local governments only2) is $39.18 per 
hour. However, Philipaitis explained Private sector beneﬁ  ts have gone through signiﬁ  cant restructuring 
over the past several decades, while public sector beneﬁ  ts 
have largely remained the same.
that there are numerous caveats to be 
considered. Some of them are as follows.
The employer surveys are voluntary, 
with 15% to 20% of private sector 
employers refusing to participate 
and only 4% to 5% of public sector 
employers refusing.
More than 40% of public sector workers 
are represented by a union, while fewer 
than 10% of private sector workers are.3
•
•
Average employee tenure is twice as 
long in the public sector.4
The occupational mix of each sector 
is different: For instance, roughly two-
thirds of public sector jobs are profes-
sional and administrative, while 51% 
of private sector jobs are; and retail 
sales and food service jobs, relatively 
low-paid and often part-time positions, 
represent 20% of private sector jobs, 
but only 2% of public sector jobs.5
Philipaitis also compared selected occupa-
tions that do exist in both sectors, such 
as nurses, accountants, lawyers, and civil 
engineers. He noted that the hourly 
wages for these highly skilled professions 
tended to be better in the private sector, 
but added that when the value of beneﬁ  ts 
is also considered, the result may favor 
the public sector. Among union mem-
bers in both sectors, overall compensa-
tion levels are actually quite similar.
Keith A. Bender, associate professor of 
economics, University of Wisconsin–
Milwaukee, expanded on the issue of 
wage distribution. In low-skill jobs, pub-
lic sector wages exceed private sector 
wages, but in high-skill jobs, public sec-
tor wages signiﬁ  cantly lag private sector 
wages (beneﬁ  ts are not included in this 
analysis). This is what some academics 
call the “double imbalance”—that is, 
assuming that the private sector repre-
sents efﬁ  cient operation of the labor 
market, the public sector is overpaying 




Bender then discussed the limitations 
of employer survey data and illustrated 
the importance of controlling for factors 
such as education, age, and occupation 
when comparing wages. Using a simple 
example with data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s March 2008 Current Population 
Survey, he demonstrated that when one 
controls for none of these characteris-
tics, public sector employees appear to 
receive an 18.6% wage premium over 
private sector employees. But when one 
controls for gender, race, education, 
union membership, age, occupation, 
and state of residence, public sector 
workers have a 4.5% wage discount as 
compared with private sector workers.
Jeffrey R. Brown, the William G. Karnes 
Professor of Finance, University of Illinois 
at Urbana–Champaign, focused on the 
cost of beneﬁ  ts. He noted that according 
to 2008 ECEC data, the employer cost 
per hour for beneﬁ  ts is $13.41 in the 
public sector (state and local governments 
only) and $7.93 in the private sector. 
This difference arises primarily from 
health and retirement beneﬁ  ts. Health 
and retirement programs are more widely 
available in the public sector, with a higher 
level of participation in them among its 
employees. In addition, the public sector 
provides more generous beneﬁ  ts and 
greater employer subsidies. For example, 
60% of part-time state and local govern-
ment employees receive pension beneﬁ  ts, 
and two-thirds of public pensions include 
automatic cost of living increases, which 
are now rare in the private sector.
Brown also noted that approximately 25% 
of state and local government employees 
across the nation do not participate in 
Social Security, and thus they rely heavily 
on their employer deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans 
in retirement. Although it is typically 
beneﬁ  cial for these employees to pay into 
their public pension plans rather than 
Social Security, Brown noted that this ex-
emption may not survive future Social 
Security reforms because of the high costs 
of public pension plans. He emphasized 
how valuable public employee pension 
beneﬁ  ts are, particularly when they are 
protected from impairment by a state’s 
constitution (as in Illinois), because they 
transfer investment risk from the employ-
ee to the employer. The recent crisis in 
the ﬁ  nancial markets has made the value 
of protected deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans all 
the more obvious to private sector work-
ers with 401(k) retirement accounts, 
which are unprotected and have seen 
substantial losses.
Can the current structure of public 
sector wages and beneﬁ  ts be sustained?
Private sector beneﬁ  ts have gone through 
signiﬁ  cant restructuring over the past sev-
eral decades, while public sector bene-
ﬁ  ts—usually including a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t 
plan and some form of retiree health 
care—have largely remained the same. 
Given the deteriorating condition of 
state and local governments’ ﬁ  nances, 
the forum’s participants turned their 
attention to the sustainability of public 
sector wages and beneﬁ  ts. 
Allen T. Steinberg, principal, Hewitt 
Associates, described the dramatic 
erosion of the private sector retirement 
system over the past ten to 20 years. In 
1998, 68% of the Fortune 500 ﬁ  rms 
offered some form of an ongoing pen-
sion plan. By 2008, this percentage had 
fallen to 42%. The drop in retiree health 
care coverage was even more dramatic 
for retiree coverage before Medicare 
eligibility (age 65), having fallen from 
88% in 1991 to 33% in 2008. Retiree 
coverage after Medicare eligibility also 
dropped from 80% to 27% over the 
same period.
Steinberg suggested several factors have 
led to this change in private sector be-
havior. Some of them are as follows:
Move from “career” employment 
to shorter-term “transactional” 
employment;
Accounting rule changes requiring 
increased transparency and account-
ability for the funded status of a 
pension plan;
Asset volatility and equity exposure;
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Increasing life spans and medical 
cost inﬂ  ation;
Regulatory burdens and costs;
Increasing use and acceptance of 
deﬁ  ned contribution plans; and
Need to reduce costs in the face of 
industry competition.
In contrast, in the public sector roughly 
80% of state and local government em-
ployees have a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plan and 
75% receive some form of a retiree medi-
cal subsidy. While this is a stark difference, 
Steinberg cautioned against making 
direct comparisons between public sector 
and private sector beneﬁ  ts. Some of the 
drivers affecting private sector beneﬁ  ts 
are less present in public sector beneﬁ  ts. 
The key to any beneﬁ  ts program is to 
accurately and honestly assess the risk 
across the entire plan. In particular, im-
portant elements to examine are the 
costs of early retirement, the mortality/ 
longevity risk, the extent of survivor cov-
erage, and projections of inﬂ  ation and 
asset volatility. Steinberg suggested that 
the relative stability of public sector ben-
eﬁ  ts over the past few decades reﬂ  ects 
key traits of public sector employees. 
These traits include greater longevity on 
the job as well as higher union participa-
tion, which tends to support these ben-
eﬁ  ts through the collective bargaining 
process. However, because of substantial 
funding shortfalls, certain elements will 
need to be revisited if the beneﬁ  ts are 
to be sustained for future workers.
Chicago Transit Authority—
A case study 
In 2007, the Chicago Transit Authority’s 
(CTA) pension fund had a funded ratio 
of 26%.6 The fund was teetering on the 
verge of insolvency. James Franczek, part-
ner, Franczek Radelet and Rose, which 
represented the CTA, and Jorge Ramirez, 
secretary-treasurer, Chicago Federation 
of Labor, described the negotiations that 
took place that prevented the collapse 
of the CTA pension fund. Franczek be-
gan by explaining that the CTA pension 
fund was responsible for both pension 
beneﬁ  ts and health care costs. Given 
these two liabilities (and chronic under-
funding), the decline in the fund was 





The negotiations between the CTA and 
its labor union focused on both pension 
and health care beneﬁ  ts reforms. 
With respect to pension reforms, the CTA 
agreed to boost its contribution from 
6% to 12% of payroll, while employee 
contribution levels also doubled from 
3% to 6%. Next, it was agreed to issue a 
pension obligation bond of $1.1 billion, 
which boosted the pension funds’ funded 
ratio to 72%. The agreement also re-
quired that the funded ratio stay above 
60% through 2039 and reach 90% by 
2060. Finally, governance reforms and 
changes to pension beneﬁ  ts for new 
hires were added.
In regard to beneﬁ  ts reforms, an inde-
pendent health care trust was established 
with $528.8 million from the bond sale 
proceeds. This removed health care costs 
from the pension fund, Franczek ex-
plained. Employees are required to con-
tribute at least 3% of compensation (on 
a pretax basis) to the retiree health care 
trust. In addition, the reforms required 
retiree contributions for health care cover-
age, as well as an increase in the thresh-
old for retiree eligibility (retirees must 
now be 55 or older, with ten years of ser-
vice instead of just three years as before). 
Also, cost reimbursement for health care 
services for retirees was reduced from 
100% to 90% in network and 70% out 
of network. 
The agreement between the CTA and 
its union was dependent on the state 
legislature passing legislation identifying 
additional dedicated funding. In return 
for the pension and health care conces-
sions, CTA union members were given 
a ﬁ  ve-year collective bargaining agree-
ment; it granted annual wage increases 
of 3% for the next three years and annual 
wage increases of 3.5% for the subse-
quent two years.
Ramirez explored possible reasons be-
hind the rapid decline of the CTA pen-
sion fund. The ﬁ  rst issue he identiﬁ  ed 
was that the trustees of the pension fund 
had no voice in setting either the ben-
eﬁ  ts or funding levels. This lack of au-
thority among trustees, he argued, led 
to a pattern where monies intended for 
the pension fund were used for ongo-
ing operating deﬁ  cits; in other words, 
pension contributions were routinely 
skipped to meet other more immediate 
needs. Ramirez suggested that a key 
reform would give the trustees the au-
thority to perform as true ﬁ  duciaries; 
with such powers, they could focus on 
protecting the assets of the fund for its 
participants. Also, he said, the solvency 
of the pension plan should be required. 
Finally, he stated that the ability to pass 
on unfunded mandates to the transit 
system should be prevented—e.g., the 
recent program allowing senior citizens 
to ride free on CTA buses and trains, 
which cost the system $30 million per 
year in revenues.
Views from state legislature and a 
public union
Robert S. Molaro, former state represen-
tative (D-21st District), Illinois House of 
Representatives, presented a perspective 
from the Illinois political trenches. Molaro 
noted that the fragmented structure of 
Illinois’s pension system (many state and 
local governments’ independent pension 
funds operate under differing gover-
nance rules) makes it difﬁ  cult to come 
up with systematic reforms. Further, ben-
eﬁ  ts expansion in Illinois (while fre-
quently criticized) has for the most part 
been in line with other public sector 
systems across the United States. The 
problem has been a culture of borrowing against the pension funds for other state 
obligations; also, there’s an unwillingness 
to make necessary contributions to the 
pension funds. A simple solution, Molaro 
suggested, would be to require contribu-
tions to match the actuarially required 
contribution (ARC) every year.7 However, 
Illinois has failed to fund at the ARC and 
has compounded the problem by avoid-
ing making contributions by adopting a 
multiyear funding structure that requires 
accelerated payments in the ﬁ  nal years 
of the pension plans. This tends to push 
the problem into the future.
There have been some reforms, Molaro 
said. Legislation now requires that a fund-
ing source be identiﬁ  ed for any future 
beneﬁ  ts enhancements. Molaro suggested 
that, in addition to requiring that annual 
contributions are made at the ARC, re-
forms could include moving the retire-
ment age out for new hires and reviewing 
automatic increases in beneﬁ  ts levels. The 
biggest problem facing Illinois is that 
closing the pension fund gap will require 
new revenues. Molaro contended that 
procuring new revenues to close this gap 
would be quite challenging for legisla-
tors; e.g., raising taxes to pay for state 
employee pensions would be highly 
unpopular among their constituents.
Hank Scheff, director of research and 
employee beneﬁ  ts, AFSCME (American 
Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees) Council 31 (in 
Illinois), stated that wages and beneﬁ  ts 
reﬂ  ect contract negotiations and that 
Illinois’s problems stem from under-
funding pensions—and not the level of 
beneﬁ  ts provided. Scheff argued that 
deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans are not necessarily 
more costly than deﬁ  ned contribution 
plans. Scheff suggested that deﬁ  ned 
contribution plans are more costly to 
administer for employers than deﬁ  ned 
beneﬁ  t plans. And he noted that studies 
suggest that individuals receive lower 
investment returns, on average, from 
deﬁ  ned contribution plans than from 
deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans. In addition, de-
ﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans do a better job at pool-
ing mortality risk, which ensures that the 
fund has enough assets to cover partici-
pants regardless of how long they receive 
beneﬁ  ts. Scheff concluded that the only 
solution to Illinois’s underfunded pen-
sion system is to identify new revenues. 
Conclusion
Participants at the forum identiﬁ  ed sev-
eral factors and trends that help explain 
differences in wages and beneﬁ  ts between 
the public sector and private sector. It 
is an open question whether the current 
structure of public sector beneﬁ  ts is sus-
tainable without either new revenues 
or reductions in beneﬁ  ts.  
1 In deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension plans, retirees 
are typically provided a monthly annuity 
that is based on years of service, ﬁ  nal 
average salary, and age at retirement. 
The employer and/or employee make 
annual contributions to an employer-
owned retirement fund, and the employer 
bears the investment and mortality risks. 
In deﬁ  ned contribution plans, such as 
401(k) and 403(b) plans, the employer 
and/or employee make annual contribu-
tions to an employee retirement account, 
but there is no guaranteed beneﬁ  ts level 
at retirement. The employee bears the 
investment and mortality risks. 
2 The ECEC survey excludes federal gov-
ernment employers.
3 U.S. Census Bureau, 2008 Current 
Population Survey. When the data are con-
trolled for union participation, average 
compensation levels in the public and pri-
vate sectors are much more similar. Union 
workers are typically better compensat-
ed than nonunion workers. December 
2008 ECEC data showed that in the pri-
vate sector, average total compensation 
was $36.22 per hour for union workers 
compared with $26.31 per hour for non-
union workers.
4 U.S. Census Bureau, 2008 Current 
Population Survey.
5 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007 
Occupational Employment Statistics survey 
and 2007 National Compensation Survey.
6 A funded ratio is the ratio of net assets 
to actuarially determined liabilities.
7 Funding at the ARC means that the govern-
ment is meeting the normal (or service) 
cost and the amortized unfunded actuar-
ial accrued liability (UAAL). The UAAL 
is the ratio of the excess of the actuarial 
accrued liability to the actuarial value of 
the assets.